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Summary: This essay argues that neither the etiologi-
cal nor the dispositional account of functions conforms
to the actual practice by which functions are ascribed
in biology. Philip Kitcher’s account, which unifies what
is common to both accounts, is assessed against what
biologists are actually doing when they ascribe functi-
ons. Two problems of Kitcher’s account are identified:
it is too liberal and it tends to circularity, insofar as it
presupposes teleological notions. Finally, an alternative
account of functions is provided by characterizing the
system of sentences that report natural history.
1 Biological functions
Functions are used both in order to explain what something is
and why it is doing what it does, by citing one of its effects. This
sort of explanation is unproblematic in the case of artefacts, for
artefacts are intentionally designed to do something. Functions
are also attributed, however, to natural objects, and biologists
have found it difficult, even undesirable, to eliminate this form of
explanation from their discussions of biological phenomena (Allen
und Bekoff 1995: 610). Thus, we are in need of an account of
natural teleology. We have to answer the question of how it is
possible to explain something by citing its function, i.e. one of its
effects.
There are two dominant positions in the debate on biological
functions, providing two different answers to this question. On
the one hand, the etiological account, first elaborated by Wright
(1973), understands functions as effects of objects which contri-
buted to the presence or persistence of those objects. More spe-
cifically, the most prominent versions of this account understand
functions as selected effects (cf. Millikan (1984); Neander (1991);
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Griffiths (1993); Godfrey-Smith (1994); Allen und Bekoff (1995)).
According to these philosophers, functional explanations are un-
problematic because they refer to what was initially responsible
for the existence of some object. On the other hand, the disposi-
tional account, first elaborated by Cummins (1975), understands
functions as effects which contribute to more complex dispositions
of the relevant containing system. Since function ascriptions are
interest-relative, according to this account, to explain something
by reference to its function is to refer to its causal role in produ-
cing other things that interest us. Hence, functional explanations
seem innocuous.
Although the question as to which account should be favoured
was initially hotly contested, today most commentators agree
that these two accounts pick out two different notions of function,
which should be kept apart (cf. Godfrey-Smith (1999); Millikan
(2002); McLaughlin (2001)). In contrast, Philip Kitcher argues
that we are in need of a unified account of function, for whilst
both accounts seem to relate to functions as they are attributed
in biology, each of them captures only some aspect of how they
are ascribed in particular biological fields. By paying attention
to the different function ascription practices in biology, Kitcher
wants to provide a unified account of functions.
I am sympathetic to Kitcher’s sensitivity to the actual practices
of ascribing functions in biology. It seems to me that the deba-
te would substantially profit from similar endeavours to analyze
what biologists are actually doing when they are ascribing func-
tions to the structures and behaviours of organisms. Therefore, I
wish to assess Kitcher’s unified account and discuss an alterna-
tive account which follows him in paying attention to biological
practice.
I start by establishing the need for a unified account. I do so by
considering different ways of reacting to the fact that there are
these two conceptions of function. As will be shown, there are
only two options available for someone who takes the different
biological practices of ascribing functions seriously: one has to
provide either an account that unifies what is common to tho-
Unity in the Concept of Function 93
se two conceptions of function, or an alternative account which
does not reduce teleological to non-teleological vocabulary. I pre-
sent Kitcher’s account as the most promising version of a unified
reductionist account in section 3, and discuss two possible pro-
blems for his account in section 4. Finally, I sketch an alternative
account of biological function.
2 Two conceptions of function
There are two conceptions of biological function acknowledged in
the current debate: the etiological and the dispositional accounts.
According to the most prominent version of the former, some item
X has the function of doing F if it has been selected for doing F.
According to the latter, functions are effects that contribute to
more complex dispositions of a containing system.
Proponents of the etiological account of biological functions think
that their account has the following merits: (α) it accounts for
the distinction between a trait’s proper function and its merely
accidental effects, (β) it accounts for the possibility of a trait
malfunctioning, and (γ) it maintains a realist view in respect of
functions.
However, there are some well-known issues with this account: (χ)
since the first occurrence of a trait has not been selected for, the
initial effect of that trait which has led to the recurrence of a
similar trait in the descendant organisms cannot be the function
of the original trait, (ψ) this account cannot differentiate between
functions and vestiges, and (ω) according to this account, but
contrary to our practice, we would have to ascribe functions to
whole organisms (McLaughlin 2001: 99).
The dispositional account’s merits and disadvantages mirror the
etiological account’s disadvantages and merits: it is not commit-
ted to (χ), (ψ), and (ω), but cannot account for (α), (β), and
(γ). This account is not committed to the counter-intuitive claim
that an ancestor’s behaviour does not have a function, although
it behaves in exactly the same way as its descendants do. Neit-
her does it imply that useless traits, which were once selected,
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should be considered as having a function. Nor does it entail that
we should ascribe a function to whole organisms. It, therefore,
accords with ordinary use. Yet the dispositional account cannot
distinguish between a trait’s proper behaviour and its accidental
effects. Neither can it account for a biological trait’s malfunctio-
ning. Since this account cannot maintain a realist position with
regard to function, functions seem to be imposed on nature by
us.
How are we to react to there being those two conceptions of func-
tion in light of their problems? There are four options available:
1. Claim that one of the two accounts is right (and reformulate
it in order to avoid its problems).1
2. Claim that these two accounts should be kept apart because
they serve different purposes.
3. Provide a unified reductionist account.
4. Develop an alternative account of biological functions accor-
ding to which functions are not be analysed in non-teleological
vocabulary.
Which options are available to a philosopher who takes current
biological practices of ascribing functions seriously?
We have to rebut option (1) if we consider the practices in e.g.,
both behavioral ecology and developmental biology, given that
function ascriptions in such fields as developmental biology often
appear to make no reference to evolution or selection, whereas
1 Recently, two accounts have been developed that try to improve
the etiological and dispositional account, respectively, by appeal to
“self-reproduction”. According to McLaughlin’s version of the etio-
logical account 2001, something has a function if it contributed to
its own maintenance over time. According to Weber’s version of the
dispositional account 2005, a capacity is a function if it is part of a
coherent system of capacities. A system of capacities is coherent if
each capacity contributes to another capacity. Such a system of ca-
pacities explains how an organism can self-reproduce. Both accounts
have problems, however, ascribing functions to reproductive organs,
as reproductive organs do not contribute to the self-reproduction of
an organism.
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function ascriptions in such fields as behavioral ecology do not
depend on the contribution of a behavior to a more complex dis-
position.
What about option (2)? Godfrey-Smith (1999), for example, ar-
gues for this position. He claims that etiological and dispositional
accounts relate two different concepts and that there is no strong
reason for using the same word for both kinds of function. We
have to rebut this option, however, if we consider an account
based on that proposal as being an explanation of how functi-
ons are attributed in biology. For, irrespective of the particular
field, function attributions in biology do not seem to be interest-
relative (cf. Weber 2005: 191). Thus, the dispositional account,
which claims that function ascriptions depend on the investiga-
tor’s interest, cannot cover the function-attribution practice of
any of the fields in biology. Since the etiological account does not
cover all fields, the practice of ascribing functions in some fields
would still be unexplained, if we accepted a pluralistic view of
functions.
What then of options (3) and (4)? Option (4) aims to account for
functions without trying to reduce teleological to non-teleological
vocabulary. It is not obvious whether such an account would con-
flict with the different practices of function ascription in the dif-
ferent areas of biology — although one might suspect it might. In
any event, such an account would not be very fashionable since
there seems to be a general agreement among commentators that
a reductive program is the only way to treat functions. I shall
therefore postpone the discussion of this option to section 5, in
which I explicate such an account, and consider now option (3).
If a unified account of functions could be provided, it would both
be sensitive to the pluralistic practice of ascribing functions in
biology and be able to account for what is common to these diffe-
rent ascriptions. On the assumption that pluralism is untenable,
it is the only reductive account available to the philosopher who
takes seriously the current practices of function ascriptions in the
different areas of biology.
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Having established the need for a unified account of function,
I now want to present and discuss Kitcher’s version of such an
account.
3 Kitcher’s unified account of function
In “Function and Design”, Kitcher proposes a unified account of
function that is general not only insofar as it pays attention to
the pluralistic function-attribution practice in biology, but also
in virtue of it covering functions of both artefacts and organisms.
According to Kitcher, the key notion for understanding the con-
cept of a function is design. Artefacts have functions because
they are intentionally designed to do something. For instance,
the function of a microwave oven is to heat meals because that
is what it is designed to do. Likewise, there is a direct link bet-
ween the functions of organisms and their design. Pre-Darwinian
accounts of function presupposed divine intentions in order to
explain the design of organisms. According to post-Darwinian
accounts, however, “we can think of design without a designer”
(Kitcher 2003: 160). The source of natural design lies in the ac-
tion of natural selection: what a given organ is designed to do is
that for which it was selected.
Up to this point, Kitcher’s account seems to correspond to the
etiological account. What the functions of artefacts and of or-
ganisms have in common is that they both depend on design.
Nonetheless, according to Kitcher, this dependence can be more
or less direct. So, for example, it is possible that a person who is
making a machine forgets to fit a certain component that plays
a crucial part in the machine’s proper functioning. If something
accidentally becomes lodged in the right position, however, and
fulfils the job of the forgotten component, then we can ascribe a
function to it even though that thing is not intentionally designed
to do what it is now doing. Equally, a biological trait may respond
to a selection pressure, and thus be attributed a function, even
though it is not designed to do what it does because it was not
selected for doing that. In such cases, functions are attributed to
Unity in the Concept of Function 97
entities that are not designed to do something, but rather stand
in an indirect relation to design: they fulfil tasks that are imposed
on them by the design of the whole.
Now, one could worry that the unity arising from the notion of
design might reveal itself as rather superficial, insofar as one could
argue that we attribute two different conceptions of design to ar-
tefacts and to organisms. We would also need a unified account of
design. Thus, it seems as if this notion cannot cover the different
ascriptions of functions.
Yet, notwithstanding the mentioning of ‘design’ in the title of his
paper, on a more careful reading of “Function and Design”, it
seems to me that this notion does not play such a crucial part
in Kitcher’s account of function. More recently, Kitcher (2011)
claims that the notion of a problem background is what really
constitutes the unity in the concept of function: something has
a function, if it stands in a context involving a problem back-
ground and responds as a solution to those problems. In the case
of artefactual functions, the inventor of an artefact faces a pro-
blem, and the wish to solve it serves as the basis of the artefact’s
function. In the biological case, the problems are generated by
selection pressures arising from the interaction between the orga-
nism’s constitution and its environment.
The notion of a problem background unites the two conceptions of
biological function. For, on the one hand, an organism only has
a problem background, if it faces selection pressures, whilst on
the other, biologists in certain areas attribute functions without
knowing the exact evolutionary history of a trait of an organism.
Instead, they rely on the problem background for the organism
in question in order to pick out the contributions its traits make
to solving some problem.
In summary, Kitcher’s unified account of function captures the in-
tuitions behind both conceptions. As per the etiological account,
this account emphasises the role of natural selection for ascribing
functions, insofar as a problem background is constituted only
by selection pressures. Akin to the dispositional account, this ac-
count does not demand that a trait’s contribution to survival or
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reproduction be one that has been naturally selected for, in order
to be reckoned as its function; rather, the contribution has to be
seen as responding to the organism’s problem background.
4 Two problems for Kitcher’s account
In section 2, I considered how one might react to there being two
conceptions discussed in the current debate on biological function.
I excluded two ways of reacting: claiming that only one account
is right, and claiming that the two conceptions should be kept
apart because they serve two different purposes. After presenting
Kitcher’s unified account, I would now like to ask whether this
account is really available to the philosopher who takes the biolo-
gical practices of ascribing functions seriously, and whether this
account really explains what it is supposed to explain. I shall pre-
sent two reasons why both questions might be answered in the
negative.
Concerning the first question, Kitcher’s account may well fail to
conform to the biological practice of ascribing functions, inso-
far as his account might be considered too liberal. As with the
dispositional account, this account makes every contribution of
a trait to the survival or reproduction of the organism look to
be its function, even if the contribution happens accidentally. I
am not sure, though, whether biologists do indeed recognise such
contributions as functions.
Here is an example of such an accidental contribution. This exam-
ple is the closest analog to Kitcher’s own example of an indirect
artefactual function. As stated earlier, it is Kitcher’s view that
we can attribute a function to an artefact’s forgotten component
which accidentally becomes lodged in the right position and, thus,
fulfils a job. Similarly, even the accidental contribution of a trait
to the survival of the organism can, according to his account, be
recognised as its function. However, in the case of biological func-
tion, we would have to attribute a function even to a disease were
it to contribute to the overall fitness of the organism. Indeed, di-
seases need not have uniformly negative effects on the fitness of
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organisms. As Jarosz und Davelos (2006) indicate, fungal endo-
phytes of the genus Myriogenospora reduce both the growth and
reproduction of plants but also provide protection from herbivor-
es. Thus, grasses infected with fungal endophytes of this genus
have slightly increased fitness relative to uninfected plants un-
der high herbivore pressures. Yet, although phytologists notice
the positive effects certain fungal endophytes have on their hosts,
they do not seem to consider them as functions for these hosts
— as they ought, according to Kitcher’s account.2
Concerning the second question, as to whether or not this account
explains what it is supposed to explain, I would like to suggest
that Kitcher’s account is circular insofar as it presupposes teleolo-
gical notions. The notion of a problem background seems to have
application only for things that aim at being in certain conditions.
Thus we can attribute this notion only if we already understand
that to which it applies as something that should be a certain
way. But to understand something in this way is to understand
it as having a telos — yet that is exactly what Kitcher’s account
of function is supposed to provide.
Let me illustrate my claims with a quotation from Kitcher’s
“Function and Design”. He writes:
“Holding the principal features of the environment fixed,
we can ask what selective pressures are imposed on mem-
bers of a group of organisms. In posing such questions
we suppose that some of the general properties of the or-
ganisms do not vary and consider the obstacles that must
be overcome if organisms with those general properties are
to survive and reproduce in environments of the type that
interests us.” (Kitcher 2003: 161, my emphasis)
2 To be sure, under certain conditions, allowing some fungi to thrive
on the plant could be a function. The infection of a plant with some
fungal endophytes would only count as something the plant allows,
however, if we could distinguish cases when the plant fights the
infection from those when it remains passive. Yet, the cases Jarosz
und Davelos (2006) report do not leave room for such a distinction.
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We ascribe functions by identifying contributions to the overco-
ming of obstacles and we identify obstacles by considering what
it is that organisms of a certain constitution, in a certain envi-
ronment, have to overcome if they are to survive and reproduce.
Now, how are we to understand the if-clause of the last sentence?
We can understand it either as simply hypothetical thinking or
as what those organisms are supposed to do. I suggest that only
if we understand it in the latter sense, can we identify the need to
survive and to reproduce as that which constitutes real pressures
imposed on organisms. Since those needs can only constitute real
pressures for organisms, if they are supposed to obtain, organisms
are supposed to have those needs. To say that organisms need to
reproduce, to survive long enough, and to be fertile, is, however,
to say that organisms should do certain things. Yet an account of
biological function is supposed to explain how we are to under-
stand that organisms should do certain things. In this respect,
Kitcher’s account shows a certain degree of circularity.
5 An alternative account of function
What might an alternative account of biological function look
like? I would now like to sketch such an account. In contrast
to the three accounts discussed so far, an alternative account of
biological function need not consist in a reduction of teleological
to non-teleological vocabulary. Instead, the concept of a biological
function can be shown to relate to a form of description of events.
This concept is then elucidated by showing how such a particular
form of description differs from other forms of description.
Let me explain. The debate about how to understand biological
functions is dominated by the view that to explain the concept
of a function is to say something about the content of a function-
ascribing sentence. According to the standard view, an analysis
of the concept of a function consists in specifying necessary and
sufficient conditions for something to be reckoned as falling under
this concept. In contrast, the alternative project here proposed is
to characterize a system of sentences to which a sentence joining
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an item x and a predicate F belongs, if it is true that x has the
function of doing F. Therefore, this alternative account proceeds
by analysing a system of sentences which do not contain explicit
ascriptions of function.
I now look at cases of implicit function-ascriptions in order to
show how such an alternative account might explain the concept
of a biological function. The example I discuss is from the same
paper Kitcher uses in order to illustrate his own account. The
following account reports the natural history of spiders of the
species Nephila clavipes:
“Spiderlings overwinter in the egg sac for six to eight
months, emerging under favourable conditions in March.
[. . . After two or three weeks] spiderlings [. . . ] build and
inhabit individual orbs on which prey are captured. In
early July, males begin to mature adulthood and aban-
don their orbs in search of females. Males compete for a
position proximal to the female, near the hub of the web.
[. . . ] Copulations occur primarily during the two-day pe-
riod immediately following the female’s final moult [. . . ].
During the next few months females lay up to three egg
clutches, each containing several hundred eggs. [. . . ] Se-
cond instars, capable of silk production, overwinter within
the egg sac without the benefit of the mother’s protecti-
on.” (Christenson und Wenzl 1980: 1110)
What functions are implicitly attributed in this account? Let me
make explicit some of the functions to be found. The egg sac
has the function of protecting the spiderlings in overwintering.
The building and inhabiting of orbs has the function of capturing
prey. The males’ abandoning of their orbs has the function of
finding females to mate. The males’ competing behaviour has the
function of copulating with a female, and copulation, obviously,
has the function of reproduction.
Now, how did I identify these different functions? Two principles
seem to be at work in identifying them. The first principle is that
whenever this account reports that spiders do F in, on or with
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some item x, then doing F is the function of x. Ascribing a func-
tion to the egg sac, for instance, accords with this principle. The
second principle seems to be that contributing to the behaviour
mentioned in a subsequent sentence is the function of the beha-
viour mentioned in a previous sentence. Ascribing the function
of copulating to the competing behaviour of males, for instance,
accords with this principle. Thus, the sentences reporting this na-
tural history correspond to one of two schemata: they have either
the form ‘The S does F in, on or with x ’ or ‘First, the S does
F, and then it does G’. Functions that are expressed in sentences
corresponding to the first schema are attributed to structures or
organs. Functions of the second kind, on the other hand, are at-
tributed to behaviour. Yet, functions of the latter kind are prior
to functions of the former kind, since instances of the first sche-
ma are embedded in the second schema and, therefore, depend
on there being functions of the latter kind.
As the second schema orders its sentences, these sentences form
a system. The system in question is temporally ordered, such
that each sentence within this system reports what members of
this species do at a certain stage in their lives. As can be seen
in the example, such a system starts and ends with a sentence
reporting the behaviour of a new generation. Thus, the system
is characterizable as a cyclical system: what is reported in this
system happens again and again in the same order. However, the
sentences that are part of this system do not only relate to each
other in virtue of depicting what happens earlier or later; they
depend on each other, insofar as each sentence is only intelligible
and thus true as part of the whole system.
Consider a cyclical system for which this is not true, for instan-
ce, the Carbon-Nitrogen-Oxygen cycle (the CNO-cycle), which is
the dominant source of energy in stars more massive than the
sun. Although the sentences describing the CNO-cycle form a cy-
clical system, these sentences do not presuppose the system in
order to be intelligible. So, for example, a sentence describing the
transformation from nitrogen to oxygen (147 N +
1
1H → 158 O+ γ)
is intelligible and true independently of the cycle. In contrast,
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we could not understand a sentence such as “Copulations occur
primarily during the two-day period immediately following the
female’s final moult”, were there not a system in the background
reporting the natural history of the species in question. For the
reference to moult and reproduction would be void.
In summary, the sentences reporting the natural history of a spe-
cies form a cyclical system on which their intelligibility and truth
depend. We can therefore characterize such a cyclical system as
a holistic system.3
After characterizing the system of sentences reporting the natu-
ral history of a species, I am now in a position to give an account
of biological function. If the observation is correct that biologists,
in expanding our knowledge, aim at contributing true sentences
to cyclical and holistic systems, then to ascribe a particular func-
tion to a structure or behaviour is to claim that any sentence
joining the structure or behaviour with a subject belongs to such
a system. In other words, the question whether something has
a function asks whether a sentence mentioning this structure or
behaviour is part of a cyclical and holistic system of sentences.
To ask what function a structure or behaviour has is to ask for
the position of the relevant sentence within such a system.
6 Conclusion
The account of biological function presented in this paper differs
from standard accounts in several respects. First, it does not at-
tempt to reduce teleological to non-teleological vocabulary, as it
has not been established that teleological explanations are mo-
re complex mechanical explanations. Second and relatedly, this
account does not specify the necessary and sufficient conditions
3 According to Weber (2005), functions are capacities that form a
coherent system. He characterizes such a system as both cyclical
and holistic. Whereas I describe a system of sentences, he holds
that it is the capacities themselves which constitute such a system.
Therefore, his account – unlike my own – seems to have problems
ascribing functions to reproductive organs.
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for something to fall under the concept of a function. Instead, I
have offered an account of biological functions by reflecting on
how biological facts are represented. Sentences reporting biologi-
cal phenomena form a special kind of system. Such a system of
sentences is special in being both cyclical and holistic. In order to
give a full account of biological functions, one would have to say
more to characterize the system of sentences in question.4 Howe-
ver, if my considerations are right, then ascribing a function to a
structure or behaviour is claiming that a sentence which joins this
structure or behaviour with its subject is part of such a system.5
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